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Over the course of a year, not counting most vacations, there are
more than 250 weekdays. I mention this because, as everyone here
who knows Justice Blackmun recalls, this number also approximates
the number of breakfasts any given set of clerks might have with the
Justice. During October Term (O.T.) 1976, when I clerked for him, I
lived just behind the Court in the basement of the building at 204 East
Capitol Street, literally a stone's throw from the Court and its cafete-
ria. Because of both my proximity to the building and my keen
awareness that breakfast provided a unique chance to get to know my
boss better, I became a regular attendee at those breakfasts with the
Justice. (I'm not saying I was in the Cal Ripken category, but I did
fairly well.)
One topic that engaged the Justice's attention with some regular-
ity was the job of judging: in particular, he would often reflect on how
he came to be on the Eighth Circuit, his perspective on the famous
course of events that led to his appointment to the Supreme Court,
and the process of adjudication that was unfolding before all of our
eyes. Invariably, when the talk turned to President Nixon's decision
to turn to a judge from "Southern Minnesota," as the editorial cartoon
framed in his chambers joked, he would introduce the subject with a
sigh and say something like, "That's when the ton of bricks fell on
me." I always had a mixed reaction to that metaphor. On the one
hand, it struck me as extraordinarily odd: here was a person talking
about possibly the greatest good fortune and highest honor that could
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befall a lawyer in our society-an appointment to the Supreme Court!
And yet, in another sense I think even then I had some understanding
of the point he was making. The morning after the celebration over
the appointment, he must have begun to feel the magnitude and grav-
ity of the responsibility of sitting as one of nine justices. Judge Moore
and I both know that judges on the courts of appeals, as he was at the
time, are not exempt from their share of controversial and difficult
cases, even though we have the comparative luxury (or frustration) of
knowing that we may not have the last word. At the Supreme Court,
though, there is an entirely different sense of finality. And it was not
long before Justice Blackmun felt the full brunt of the burden of de-
ciding cases that presented some of the most fundamental questions
the twentieth century has seen.
So the "ton of bricks" metaphor is an apt one. It is characteristic
of Justice Blackmun not to be swept away by the superficial trappings
of the position, not to be intoxicated by the power the Court wields,
and not to view the relentless flood of cases as a private intellectual
game. For him, the salient feature of the position of Associate Justice
on the Supreme Court of the United States was the profound respon-
sibility he bore to the litigants, to the Court as an institution, to the
legal community, and ultimately to the people of the United States.
I would like to take a few moments to look more closely at the
different constituencies toward which the Supreme Court and, more
important for present purposes, its individual Justices bear responsi-
bilities. In so doing, the point I would like to emphasize is the balance
Justice Blackmun drew among these groups. As is the case with the
more familiar distinction between the duty to do justice in each indi-
vidual case and the duty to follow clear, predictable rules of law, there
are certain trade-offs among audiences or constituencies that a judge
must make. Each member of the Court makes those trade-offs in dif-
ferent ways. In addition, the nature of the Supreme Court as an insti-
tution drives the balance to a certain extent, given the discretionary
nature of its docket through most of the twentieth century.
As long as the Court was a final court of error, it had both the
responsibility and the duty to ensure that a correct result occurred in
every person's case. Obviously, conscious of the fact that it was the
court of last resort in the federal system, it also paid attention to the
precedents it was setting for future parties, to the clarity of the rules it
was announcing for the legal profession, and to the legitimacy of its
actions in the eyes of the public at large. But, before all the rest of the
MIo. 26:11
interested audiences, the parties themselves had a claim on the
Court's time.
Today, ensuring correct results is no longer at the forefront of the
Supreme Court's duties. Instead, for better or for worse, the final
courts of error in the federal system are the thirteen federal courts of
appeals. In the courts of appeals, with very minor exceptions, our ap-
pellate jurisdiction is mandatory, and we hear hundreds (if not
thousands) of cases every year that are of interest only to the immedi-
ate litigants. Dispute resolution is a weighty responsibility, and these
cases are not unimportant because of that fact. They are, however,
cases that are unlikely to produce advances in the law of interest to
future parties, and they are unlikely to be of any particular interest to
the broader legal profession or the public. At the Supreme Court, as
we all know, the docket has been almost entirely discretionary since
the Judges Act in 19251-a characteristic that Congress strengthened
in 1988 when it amended the law to eliminate all but a few residual
categories of appeals of right to the Court.2 Today, Rule 10 of the
Supreme Court Rules makes it perfectly clear that a lower court deci-
sion that is merely "wrong" does not merit the Supreme Court's atten-
tion. Instead, says the Rule, "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari will
be granted only for compelling reasons."' 3 Those reasons include con-
fficts among the lower federal courts and the state courts of last resort
and such a gross departure from the "accepted and usual" course of
judicial proceedings by a lower federal court that the Court must exer-
cise its supervisory power.4 Last, lest there was any remaining glim-
mer of hope for obtaining review of more ordinary errors, the rule
warns that "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when
the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misap-
plication of a properly stated rule of law."5
I am sure that every person here who clerked for Justice Black-
mun (or any other member of the Court, for that matter) evaluated
many a petition for a writ of certiorari with the words "lower court
wrong, but nothing certworthy here." I suggest to the Hastings Con-
stitutional Law Quarterly that on another day and another occasion, it
would be interesting to study how the Court's mandate to accept only
cases of broad precedential value contributes to the tension over so-
1. Judges Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
2. Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662
(1988).
3. U.S. Sup. CT. RuLE 10.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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called "judicial activism" at the Supreme Court's level. In a world of
discretionary jurisdiction, the challenge for the Justices is to accept
only cases of nationwide import, but to be sure when they resolve
them not to stray across the implicit lines drawn by our constitutional
structure of separation of powers. However, as I said, that is not to-
day's subject. The relevance of the discretionary quality of the
Court's jurisdiction for today lies in the way responsibilities must be
balanced among those competing for the Court's attention.
You might suppose from this that the parties before the Court
may be likely to get the short end of the stick. After all, their case is
just an excuse for the Court to take a look at the pressing legal issues
of the day. O.T. 1993, the last Term for which Justice Blackmun sat as
an active Associate Justice, provides as good a sampling as any. In
that Term, the Court decided such cases as Heck v. Humphrey,6 which
has revolutionized the access of prisoners to relief under the civil
rights statutes for grievances that also implicate the validity of their
conviction; Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,7 which before O.T. 1997's
quartet of cases about sexual harassment made important clarifica-
tions to the meaning of a hostile work environment; Board of Educa-
tion of Kiryas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,8 which made it
clear that the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires
neutrality as among religions, not affirmative efforts to stamp out reli-
gion; Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc.,9 which explored the lim-
its that constitutionally could be placed on anti-abortion protesters
stationed outside clinics; Landgraf v. USI Film Products,10 now the
leading case on the rules governing retrospective application of new
legislation in the absence of express congressional direction; several
death cases, including Simmons v. South Carolina,1 where the Court
found it impossible to coalesce around a single opinion, but where
Justice Blackmun wrote for the plurality on such important topics as
the due process right of a capital defendant to have an opportunity to
explain or deny information that supports the execution; Dolan v. City
of Tigard,2 which put more teeth into the Fifth Amendment's Takings
Clause; and Liteky v. United States,'3 which was the Court's first im-
6. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
7. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
8. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
9. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
10. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
11. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
12. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
13. 510 U.S. 540 (1994).
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portant statement about judicial recusal standards in many years. I
could go on and on-indeed, some of you may think I already have-
but the point is clear. The Court had a full plate of important legal
issues in O.T. 1993, just as it does every year, and some might think
that "the law" announced in those decisions overshadowed the indi-
vidual outcomes for the litigants themselves.
Someone might think that, but that "someone" was never Justice
Blackmun. I now like to believe that perhaps because he began his
judicial career on the true court of errors, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, his first and enduring concept of the responsibility of
the judge was that it ran to the parties before him. It is an enormous
thing, after all, to decide to litigate in the first place. Whether the
plaintiff is an individual, a small firm, or a corporate behemoth, litiga-
tion is expensive, risky, and emotionally draining. Once the trial court
has ruled, many people choose to accept that first resolution of their
controversy. (I might add that in the federal courts this is often a very
wise choice, given how difficult it is to prevail on appeals where the
only question is whether the trial court made clearly erroneous find-
ings of fact, whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding to
admit or exclude certain evidence, or whether a curative instruction to
the jury was enough to address prejudicial conduct.) But some people
have their eye on a broader principle, and they are the ones who move
up the ladder to the court of appeals, and ultimately to the Supreme
Court. Justice Blackmun knows this from the very core of his being.
He is the one, after all, who wrote in dissent in DeShaney v. Winne-
bago County Dept. of Social Services about "poor Joshua."' 4 It isn't
that the doctrine of the case was unimportant to him; his dissent elab-
orated a theory that would have extended the state's responsibility far
enough to protect Joshua. It is just that he knew the case was about
and for Joshua, in the first and in many ways the most important
instance.
Precedent matters a great deal also, and Justice Blackmun knows
as well as anyone that people parse every word in a Supreme Court
opinion so that they can understand how it has interpreted the law
and what they must now do. This is one of the reasons why, through
all his years as an active justice, he pored so carefully over his opin-
ions up in the Justices' Library. (When I was working at the Court,
the joke was about where to put the apostrophe in the word "Jus-
tices." Technically, I suppose, it belonged after the final "s," to desig-
nate a possessive plural. But we always thought it belonged between
14. 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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the "e" and the "s," because for all intents and purposes the library
belonged to Justice Blackmun.) Another dissent comes most readily
to mind when I think of this aspect of the responsibility of judging:
the dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick.5 No one doubted that the case
mattered to the parties, but Justice Blackmun illustrated well in his
dissenting opinion that he feared the broad and intrusive sweep of the
rules of law on which the majority had been compelled to rely.
The responsibility to the legal profession goes beyond deciding
the cases its members present to the Court and beyond demanding
and giving that courtesy to members of the bar in a manner befitting
the best traditions of our profession. It extends also to the way in
which the Court decides its cases and the information it passes along
to the legal community.
In deciding its cases, the first issue the Court must address relates
to procedures: how is briefing handled, how much time will the par-
ties have for argument, how many questions will the Justices ask, and
how well prepared will they be? Once again, no one could hold a
candle to Justice Blackmun when it came to preparation for argument.
We all remember not just our own bench memos-brilliant creations
as they were, of course-but more importantly, the Justice's careful
annotations of them, the follow-up questions he might suddenly raise
at breakfast, and his thoughtful account of the case, the argument, and
the position of each member of the Court to us after conferences. The
opinions of the Court are the vehicle it uses to communicate with the
legal community as a whole: practicing lawyers, academics, and other
judges alike. I have already noted how careful Justice Blackmun was
to check and double-check that his opinions reflected his true views.
The second issue the Court must address is what kind of opinion
is right for the case? It is difficult for me to generalize about the Jus-
tice's positions on this issue. Some cases (though few at the Supreme
Court) are best decided with a narrow opinion, strictly limited to the
facts before the Court. Other cases lend themselves to broader pro-
nouncements, which can be extremely useful as guidance for the legal
community. Certainly the broadest statement for which the Justice
will be remembered was his conclusion in Roe v. Wade 6 that one of
the fundamental personal rights that the Constitution places beyond
the power of any state or the federal government to infringe is a wo-
man's right during the early part of pregnancy to elect an abortion.
But he made others as well, sometimes for a majority of the Court,
15. 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
16. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sometimes in dissent. We all remember his dissenting statement in
Callins v. Collins, in which he announced that "[f]rom this day for-
ward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death."' 7 He had
concluded, after twenty years' experience with the death penalty, that
it was simply impossible to design and implement a system that could
deliver, as he put it, "fair, consistent, and reliable sentences of
death."'"
Both Roe and Callins plainly were also addressed to the public at
large, to at least the same extent as they were addressed to the legal
community. And it is here, too, that Justice Blackmun has always un-
derstood that the Supreme Court is not just another court. It embod-
ies the Third Branch of our government-of the government of all the
people. As such, the Court and its individual Justices face a bit of a
dilemma. To preserve the quality of deliberation and decision-making
that it needs, the published opinion must remain the Court's only in-
stitutional statement on a subject. But at the same time, people need
to understand this institution that can have such an impact on their
lives. Justice Blackmun met this responsibility in two ways, both of
which were models for us all: first, he normally wrote his opinions in
plain, down-to-earth language, telling the story of what the case was
about and explaining why it was resolved in a certain way; second, he
was generous with his time at the law schools, the Aspen Institute, and
other fora around the country.
Although I cannot document what I am about to say with chap-
ter, book, and verse from the Justice's opinions, nor have I asked him
his own opinion about this, it has always seemed to me that the re-
sponsibilities that he would place first were those to the individual
litigants whose case the Court chose to hear and those to the public at
large. The crafting of legal doctrines for future parties, bench, and bar
is certainly not unimportant, but even at the Supreme Court it often
pays for a judge to take a modest view of his or her predictive abilities.
The great risk in writing broadly, especially for the Supreme Court
because of its finality, is that future cases may present unforeseen fac-
tual variations that illustrate the flaws in a broad, simple rule.
Whether it is better to write the broad rules anyway, and later to qual-
ify them with exceptions, or to keep the initial rule more limited and
leave room for later development may be a matter of opinion. But I
believe that, on the whole, Justice Blackmun tried to stick with the
17. 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
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latter course, as he kept his eye on his primary responsibility to the
parties before him.
Before closing, we should also think for a moment about what
exactly a judge should be doing for any audience. First and foremost,
as I have been saying, the judge must decide the case before her. No
one expressed this in a more heart-felt manner than Justice Blackmun
did, three years and three months ago, when he swore me in as a cir-
cuit judge on the back deck of the beautiful summer home he and
Mrs. Blackmun enjoyed so much on Spider Lake, Wisconsin. (He
noted, by the way, that we were within the territory of the Seventh
Circuit, which made the locale all the more fitting.) After he adminis-
tered the two oaths judges must take-the constitutional oath and the
judicial oath-he paused to reflect on the job I was about to under-
take. I would like to share his words with you, which fortunately were
preserved on the tape my son made of the entire ceremony, because I
find them a daily inspiration, and I believe they capture the Justice's
own views of the special responsibility of an appellate judge much bet-
ter than anything I could conjure up. This is what he said:
You will, of course, encounter some moments of wonder as you
do your work. Even though you will sit primarily with two other
judges, as you sit in groups of three on the federal appellate
bench, your vote will essentially be yours, and not theirs. There
will be moments of a feeling of reward and satisfaction, and mo-
ments with a feeling of disappointment, and certainly moments
of loneliness, despite the fact that you have a multiple judge
court. Because that vote is yours, and only you can make it.
Don't let it discourage you.
The Justice certainly never let the responsibility of judging discourage
him. Instead, over all the years he sat on both the Eighth Circuit and
the Supreme Court, he courageously cast his vote in accordance with
his best judgment of what the Constitution and laws required. For
those of us with the privilege of following in his footsteps, at least to
some limited degree, I can imagine no better example.
Beyond the overarching responsibility to decide the case and to
vote in accordance with one's best assessment of what the law re-
quires, there are other tasks that an appellate judge must fulfill. They
include respecting the record of the case, providing as clear a state-
ment of the reasons for the decision as is possible, and paying heed to
the kind of precedent the case will create. If one finds oneself in disa-
greement with the other judges on the court, either about rationale or
about result, it is also necessary to decide when to write separately.
Dissents at the court of appeals level can sharpen an issue for possible
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Supreme Court review or pave the way to a circuit's en banc reconsid-
eration of a case; dissents at the Supreme Court level can either alert
Congress to an issue that might call for legislative reconsideration or
can explicate a different view of constitutional requirements that may
one day be vindicated.
Justice Blackmun fulfilled all these responsibilities of the judge
throughout his career with integrity, diligence, and respect for the in-
stitution he served. Even though, as we are sometimes reminded, the
courts are passive recipients of the cases parties choose to bring
before them, de Tocqueville's observation that most important issues
eventually show up before the Supreme Court remains as true today
as when he made it. It isn't hard to see why this is true, when we
recall that the Supreme Court was receiving about 3,643 new filings a
year in O.T. 1971, when Justice Blackmun assumed his seat, and about
6,897 new filings a year in O.T. 1993, his last year of active service.
That means that the Court during his years there probably had in ex-
cess of 120,000 opportunities to select cases for its docket-more than
enough, it would seem, to pick up any question on which it wished to
speak.
This is a heavy responsibility indeed, and in that light it isn't hard
to see why the Justice so often spoke of the day when the "ton of
bricks" fell on him. We are all fortunate that his shoulders were
strong enough to bear it. As he now approaches his 90th birthday, he
continues to inspire us both by the way he has lived and the way he
has judged. On behalf of everyone here, I thank him for the opportu-
nity to work with him, and I wish him and Mrs. Blackmun all the best.
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